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I. Introduction
Corporate scandals, involving such giants of industry as Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia, ImClone, Tyco, Xerox, and others,' rocked
financial markets over the last two years and have sent investor
confidence and stock prices plummeting.2  The Dow Jones
Industrial Index fell below 8,000 points in July 2002, reaching its
lowest point in four years Employees are finding that their
retirement accounts have taken a beating in the stock market,
leading to delayed retirements and much financial uncertainty.4
The scandals were one major factor leading to a recession out
of which the United States has yet to climb. In December 2002,
unemployment levels for all workers nationwide reached six
percent.5 The response by legislators was to call to account many
of the corporate executives who have been implicated in the
wrongdoings, putting the spotlight on corporate misconduct.6
One of the means used by the federal government to increase
accountability for corporate conduct has been to utilize the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to scrutinize
questionable behavior by publicly-traded corporations, and to take
I Joseph E. Murphy, Can the Scandals Teach Us Anything?: Enron, Ethics, and
Lessonsfor Lawyers, Bus. L. TODAY, Feb. 12, 2003, at 11.
2 John W. Schoen, SEC's Pitt Hit By New Calls to Resign, MSNBC NEWS (Oct.
31, 2002), available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/828635.asp (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
3 Stocks Skid, Bus. WEEK (July 22, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com:/
print/investor/content/jul2002/pi20020722_9116.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
4 Associated Press, SEC Failed to Detect Enron Scandal, MSNBC NEWS (Oct. 7,
2002), http://www.msnbc.com/news/818101.asp (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, U.S. Department of
Labor (Feb. 2003), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
6 Schoen, supra note 2, at 1.
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action against those corporations whose behavior goes beyond
acceptable, legal practices One such enforcement action was
taken by the SEC against Dynegy, Inc., a corporation similar to
Enron in that its business was largely involved in the production of
and trade in energy.8 The SEC brought the action due to evidence
that Dynegy had been involved in activities that were in violation
of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) such as
improper use of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and so-called
"wash" energy trades.9
Part II of this paper will look at the facts of the Dynegy
enforcement action before the SEC, in particular, its treatment of
Dynegy's use of SPEs and energy wash trades.'" Next, Part III will
look at the background law of energy trades" and SPEs.'2 Finally,
Part IV will analyze the background law in relation to the facts of
the Dynegy case to see if the conclusion of the Commission was
correct. 13
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Dynegy, Inc. is an Illinois corporation headquartered in
Houston, Texas.' 4 Its shares are traded publicly on the New York
Stock Exchange under the call letters "DYN."' 5 Beginning in
2000, stock analysts noticed that the gap between Dynegy's
operating cash flow and net income widened dramatically. 6 While
the mark-to-market accounting required of energy trading
7 Id.
8 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 2 (SEC Sept. 24, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8134.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
9 Id.; For a general overview of what makes up an energy wash trade, see infra
notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 14-33.
11 See infra notes 52-102.
12 See infra notes 104-49.
13 See infra notes 150-82.
14 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 2.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 3-4.
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companies normally causes some differential between net income
and cash flow, the gap became abnormally large, and was leading
to a devaluation of Dynegy's shares. 17
To combat this development, Dynegy initiated Project Alpha
in 2000.18 Project Alpha consisted of the creation of a series of
SPEs, in which Dynegy maintained little or no ownership interest.
The SPEs were used to create off-balance sheet financing (OBSF)
in order to boost the amount of operating cash that Dynegy could
report to its shareholders, while avoiding having to show increased
indebtedness from the financing. 9 This arrangement was very
similar to the SPEs created by Enron which were a large part of
the scandal that erupted in 2001.2o In the case of Dynegy, Project
Alpha would allow Dynegy to claim an additional $300 million in
operating cash flow, as well as a $79 million tax benefit which
increased its reported net income.2'
In addition to producing energy, Dynegy also conducted
energy trades through its online trading platform, DynegyDirect.22
On November 15, 2001, Dynegy contracted with another energy
trading firm to conduct two large energy trades. 23 Each company
would send the other the same amount of energy, at the same time,
and at the same price. 24 Therefore, neither company would have to
report any income from the trade, yet they would be able to report
a large increase in overall trading volume.2 ' These trades are
known as "round-trip" or "wash" trades.26 The resulting trading
volume and operating cash flow was reported by Dynegy on its
financial statements filed with the SEC.27 The increased trading
volume was reflected in press releases from corporate headquarters
17 Id.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id.
20 See generally the case of In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative, and
ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (Tex. 2002).
21 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 4-7.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 3.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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as well as to employees who were being offered Dynegy shares.28
All of these statements combined to artificially create an increase
in the value of Dynegy stock.29
On April 3, 2002, a newspaper article was published that
brought to light the existence of the Project Alpha SPEs as well as
their connection to Dynegy.3 ° This article forced Dynegy to admit
to the SPEs' existence, but it continued to insist that their primary
purpose was to assure a continued supply of energy sources.31
However, several months later on Dynegy's 8-K forms submitted
to the SEC,32 Dynegy finally admitted that the purpose of the
Project Alpha SPEs was to shrink the gap between net income and
operating cash flow, which increased the corporation's value. 3
B. Procedural Posture
After this behavior was brought to the attention of the SEC,
Dynegy promised to revise its 2001 financial statements to better
reflect its operating cash flow and net income by restating the
$300 million received as financing rather than cash flow and by
reducing net income by the amount of the $79 million tax
benefit.34
Despite Dynegy's assurances that it would revise its financial
statements, the SEC decided to institute administrative
proceedings against Dynegy.35 These proceedings were initiated in
28 Id.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id.
31 id. at 8.
32 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all registered entities
(i.e., publicly traded corporations) to report all changes in control of the entity,
acquisition or disposition of any assets of the entity, bankruptcy or receivership status of
the entity, changes in the entity's certifying accountant, any resignations of the entity's
board of directors, and other significant events whenever they occur. Notification of
these events must be made by filing a Form 8-K with the SEC. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Form 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/8-k.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
33 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 3.
34 Id. at 3.
35 Id.
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order to obtain a cease-and-desist order.36 The cease-and-desist
order would require Dynegy to report the financial information
from Project Alpha on its financial statements and would require
Dynegy to cease all energy wash trades in the future.37 Before the
case was heard, Dynegy agreed to a settlement with the SEC.38 In
the settlement agreement, Dynegy would not have to admit to, nor
could it deny, anything that the SEC found in the subsequent
proceedings.39 Dynegy also agreed that the SEC had jurisdiction
over it for the purposes of the hearing and agreed to abide by a
decision by the SEC to impose a cease-and-desist order.4 ° This
order, if granted, would require Dynegy to stop violating federal
securities regulations. 41
C. Holding and Current Status of the Case
The result of the hearing by the SEC was that Dynegy had
indeed violated GAAP and federal securities laws.42 Because of
this finding, the SEC did impose a cease-and-desist order on
Dynegy.43 In addition, the SEC imposed a $3 million civil penalty
on Dynegy.44 Dynegy agreed to the penalty. A record of the
decision and penalty was filed in federal District Court in Houston,
the site of Dynegy's headquarters.45
This paper will look at the administrative proceedings against
Dynegy before the SEC. It will first examine the background law
and regulations that are involved in the case.46 This section will
introduce the accounting rules surrounding energy trades,47
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 9-12.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dynegy, Inc., No. 17744 (Sept. 24,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp17744.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
46 See infra notes 14-51.
47 See infra notes 14-33 and accompanying text.
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including wash trades, as well as SPEs 8 Finally, throughout this
background section, there will be a synopsis of legislation and
regulations on this subject-both in existence at the time of
Dynegy's actions as well as those proposed and passed after the
Enron debacle. 9
Next, this paper will seek to apply the applicable law to the
facts of this particular case to examine whether or not the SEC was
correct in its determination of Dynegy's wrongdoing." One of the
stipulations of the settlement was that the findings of the SEC
would not force Dynegy to admit or deny any behavior. In
addition, this paper will seek to evaluate whether proposed and
newly-enacted legislation could prevent or punish wrongdoing by
similar companies like Dynegy in the future."
III. Background Law
A. Energy Trading in General and Wash Trades in Particular
The power grid that flows through our communities and gives
energy to households and businesses is produced by many
different companies across the country and even the world. When
a power company produces excess energy, it often sells that
energy to another company in a different geographic location in
order to supplement the energy grid in that area. After deregulation
began in the 1990s, the prices and volumes at which these trades
take place are governed by the laws of supply and demand.52
However, in some cases, energy companies have been accused
of tampering with these basic laws of economics. 3 In order to
48 See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 52-149 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
52 Ernst and Young, Energy Trading, at http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/
International/Industries_-_ECU_-_Article_-_EnergyTrading (last visited Mar. 25, 2003)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation) [hereinafter Energy Trading].
53 Press Release, Representative Greg Walden, Walden, DeFazio Introduce
Legislation to Prevent Electricity Price Manipulation, Deceitful Trading Practices
Among Energy Firms (May 24, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/walden/
press/2002/may/pr052402.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter Walden Press Release].
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drive up prices and increase the volume of trades reported to their
investors, companies engage in "wash-trades" which are also
known as "round-trip trades."54 In order to effectuate such a trade,
two energy trading companies set up a time, trade volume, and
price for an energy trade.5 At the appointed time, the two
companies then send each other an equal, set volume of energy at
an equal, set price. 6 The end result is that the companies do not
have to recognize any gain or loss on the sale and both have the
same amount of energy that they had before. 7 Yet, each company
is able to report the volume of the trade on reports to their
shareholders. 8 For this reason, wash trades are usually of a high
volume. "
Before the age of deregulation, trades did not exist.6" However,
concerns about the inefficiency, waste, and possible price-fixing of
the highly regulated energy industry prompted a movement
towards deregulation in the 1990s.6 The age of energy trading was
born, and prices of energy units were left to the open market.62
Interstate energy trades are governed by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), while intrastate trading is
supervised by state or local agencies like California's Public
54 Id.
55 How Do Energy "Round-Trip" Trades Affect Credit Quality?, STANDARD &
POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT (New York, June 3, 2002), available at http://www.platts.com/
risk management/sandp/archive/060302analysis.shtml [hereinafter STANDARD &
POOR'S].
56 Id.
-
5 7 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See generally Christopher Faille, Why the Case for a Free Market in Energy
Derivatives Has Survived Enron, FED. LAW., Jan. 2003, at 39 (quoting a Joint Letter to
Congress, from Paul O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury; Alan Greenspan, chair, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System; Harvey L. Pitt, chair, Securities and Exchange
Commission; and James E. Newsome, chair, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(Sept. 18, 2002)) [hereinafter Joint Letter]. It is important to note that this letter did not
advocate a return to a highly-regulated energy industry. It points out that the regulated
system "produced a range of resource misallocations and absurdities and required the
dismantling it has in large part received." Id. at 39.
61 Id.
62 Id.
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Utilities Commission.63 A loophole in the regulations promulgated
by these bodies allowed the practice of energy wash-trades.64
While technically not illegal, they were used to create misleading
trading volume reports for investors, and while at least seven
major energy companies engaged in the practice-in some cases to
a great extent65 -no one outside of the industry was aware of the
practice until it was revealed in confidential memos released
6during the Enron investigation. These memos not only revealed
that Enron was engaging in wash trades, but they also divulged
that other energy companies were performing such trades. 67 This
revelation led to the disclosure of wash trades by Dynegy, as well
as other companies such as Reliant, CMS Energy, and Duke
Energy.68
Energy wash trades are not only misleading to investors, they
are also harmful to consumers.69 The price that is set for the wash
trades is agreed upon in advance by the two parties.7" This price is
usually set at a higher rate than the market would normally
indicate.71 The reason for the higher rate is that both companies are
engaged in the business of selling energy and both have an
incentive for prices to be high to increase apparent total sales
revenues to investors.72 In addition, since they are both selling and
buying a volume of energy at the same price, the price is
essentially immaterial to them.73 The end result of this is an
unnaturally high market price for energy.74 When other companies
63 Robert C. Fellmeth, Plunging Into Darkness: Energy Deregulation Collides With
Scarcity, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 823, 832 (2002).
64 Walden Press Release, supra note 53.
65 Id. One energy-trading company admitted that more than seventy percent of its
trading volume was in the form of wash trades. Id.
66 Traders Reveal Round Trip Trades, UTIL. Bus., May 20, 2002, available at
http://utilitybusiness.com/ar/power-tradersreveal-round/index.htm [hereinafter UTILITY
BUSINESS].
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 55.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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seek to trade energy, they will look to these reported prices for
price comparison, and then set the price for their non-wash trades
at the same rate.75 This artificially inflates prices for energy
actually consumed, and that inflated price is then imposed on
consumers in the form of higher energy rates.76
In response to the problems caused by wash trades, there have
been calls for reform-everything from eliminating wash trades to
re-regulating the entire energy industry." Most people agree that
re-regulation is not the solution, because the old, regulated
industry was not any better.78 Instead, legislation has been
introduced to stop the practice of wash trades.79 Representative
Greg Walden (R-Ore.) introduced two bills, co-sponsored by
Representatives Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), Mary Bono (R-Cal.), and
Christopher John (D-La.), to stop the practice of wash trades
altogether.8" The purpose of this legislation was to eliminate "the
most blatant abuses of the market, including [wash] trading."8 As
Representative Walden, a member of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee's Energy Subcomittee, stated: "[w]hile not
every swap may be illegal, most are certainly shady. That's why
it's time to put a stop to these schemes and protect rate payers...
throughout the country .... . 82 The first bill introduced was The
Truth in Electricity Trading Act (H.R. 4826).83 This bill would
"amend the Federal Power Act to prohibit round-trip sales and
impose penalties for violations under FERC that are similar to
current penalties for other market manipulation practices.
84
The second bill was the Truth in Electricity Revenue Reporting
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See generally Joint Letter, supra note 60.
78 Id.,
79 Walden Press Release, supra note 53.
80 Id.; see also Truth in Electricity Revenue Reporting Act of 2002, H.R. 4827,
107th Cong. (2002).
81 Walden Press Release, supra note 53.
82 Id.
83 Id.; Truth in Electricity Trading Act of 2002, H.R. 4826, 107th Cong. (2002)
[hereinafter Truth in Electricity Trading Act of 2002]. This bill was recently
reintroduced under the same name without significant changes. Truth in Electricity
Trading Act of 2003, H.R. 1254, 108th Cong. (2003).
84 Walden Press Release, supra note 53.
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Act (H.R. 4827),85 which "would amend. the Securities Exchange
Act to prohibit the recording of revenue from round-trip sales of
electric power.... [and] would treat such recording as providing
false and misleading material, which would subject energy firms to
pay penalties under the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)."86 Both of these bills were introduced on May 22, 2002.87
The former was referred to the House Committee on Financial
Services,88 and the latter was referred to the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce." As of the writing of this paper, both bills
were still in committee."
In addition to this proposed legislation, FERC has proposed
changes to its regulations. 9' It has investigated the extent of wash
trades.92 It required the approximately 150 corporations that
engage in energy trading to file a sworn statement by May 31,
2002, declaring whether they participated in wash trades.93 In
addition, if the companies admitted to wash trades, they had to
disclose all details of each such trade to FERC.94
Legislation and regulation notwithstanding, perhaps the most
effective remedy for wash trades is not a government action at all,
but rather the economic incentive provided by credit ratings given
to companies by stock analysts.95 Standard and Poor's stock index
released a report describing how stock analysts take wash trades
into account when calculating a company's credit rating.96 This
report points out how, on the surface, a wash trade does not affect
a firm's market risk and may be done for a perfectly legitimate
purpose. 97 However, all wash trades, even legitimate ones, can
85 Id.; Truth in Electricity Trading Act of 2002, H.R. 4826, 107th Cong. (2002).
86 Walden Press Release, supra note 53.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Energy Trading, supra note 52.
96 STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 55.
97 For example, a wash trade is a good way for an energy trading company to test
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have a negative impact on the marketplace:
[A] large-volume trade can create a market distortion that
changes price transparency. In theory, this could lead to market
manipulation .... If a round trip trade is conducted in an illiquid
market and disclosed publicly, it could cause a price spike,
which distorts the market's true value .... [A] round-trip trade
could be used to manipulate the.., value of a portfolio ....
[W]hen a price associated with a round-trip trade is used to mark
a position in a portfolio[,] if the mark is overvalued due to a lack
of participation in the product in question, then the ... value of
the portfolio will be overstated. This in turn will overstate
earnings. Theoretically, the over-stated earnings will be reversed
in cash flow when the actual cash is not realized, but this tactic
leads to gaming the balance sheet. 98
These distortions certainly make it more difficult for stock
analysts to accurately estimate a company's value in order to
recommend stocks to their clients.99 They must rely on reports
made public by the companies whose value they are trying to
calculate. If it is possible that there are errors or manipulations
within these reports, the analysts' job is that much harder."'
After the disclosures by energy trading companies of the
practice of wash trades, analysts have taken steps to ensure that
these trades do not happen so they are better able to predict stock
values. One analyst firm, Ernst and Young, has recommended a set
of questions that must be satisfactorily answered by senior
management executives before Ernst and Young will recommend
their company's shares to investors.10 ' These questions mostly deal
with corporate transparency and willingness to follow accounting
standards, but they do make sure that companies report "all the
assets and liabilities for which they are responsible" on their
balance sheets." 2
the market to help determine the going price for energy for use in future, non-wash
trades. STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 55.
98 STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 55.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Energy Trading, supra note 52.
102 Ernst and Young recommends the following questions be asked of energy
trading executives:
. Are the trading activities conducted consistent with the overall
2003]
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B. Special Purpose Entities (SPEs)
A Special Purpose Entity (SPE) is an organization that is
formed by another entity for a "single specified purpose."'' 3 SPEs
can be in the form of a partnership, a corporation, a trust, or a joint
venture.0 4 Under accounting standards in effect at the time of the
actions at issue in the present case, companies were required to
include information about SPEs in their financial statements -
provided that the reporting company owned a "controlling
financial interest" in the SPE.0 5 In the case of one corporation (the
sponsor) that controls another (the SPE) through voting ownership,
the two corporations would be required to file a consolidated
financial statement each year with the SEC.'0 6 These financial
statements include assets, liabilities, and any results from activities
undertaken by either company during the year.107
Therefore, if the sponsor company owned less than fifty
percent of the voting interest in the SPE, it would not have to
include the SPE's financial information on its own financial
statements or tax retums.'0 8 However, accounting rules permit the
corporate strategy and risk tolerance of the board of directors?
" Are the levels of risk exposure carried appropriate, relative to the
company's size, sophistication[,] and financial condition?
* Are the risks in the portfolio of markets, products[,] and activities
recognised [sic], understood, measured[,] and managed in a proactive
manner such that they remain consistent with the stated aims of senior
management and the board of directors?
* Are the tools and techniques employed by management appropriate
for measuring and monitoring risk exposures?
Id.
103 Proposed Interpretation: Consolidation of Certain Special-Purpose Entities: An
Interpretation of ARB No. 51 at 1, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB),
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES, File Ref. No. 1082-200, (proposed June 28, 2002)
[hereinafter FASB Interpretation].
104 Al L. Hartgraves & George J. Benston, The Evolving Accounting Standards for
Special Purpose Entities and Consolidations, ACCT. HORIZONS, Sept. 2002, at 245, at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter
Hartgraves & Benston].
105 Id.
106 Id
107 Id.
108 Jeremy Kahn, Dirty Numbers Off Balance Sheet - and Out of Control: SPEs Are
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sponsor company to contribute up to ninety-seven percent of the
SPE's equity while still being able to avoid consolidation.' °9 As
long as a third party, usually someone friendly to the sponsor
company, agrees to be the nominal owner of the SPE and
contribute three percent of the SPE's equity, the sponsor company
need not consolidate its financial information with that of the
SPE."10
SPEs first became widely used in the 1970s and 1980s,
primarily in the banking industry."' That industry allowed its
sponsor companies to "monetize, through off-balance sheet
securitizations, the substantial amounts of consumer receivables on
their balance sheets. ' 2 Generally, a SPE comes into being when
a sponsor company and a friendly third party create the SPE as a
separate entity with the third party as its nominal owner." 3 The
SPE acquires capital from the nominal owner'." and the sponsor
company. Then, the SPE issues equity and debt instruments to the
owner, sponsor company, and shareholders." 5 The SPE uses its
capital to buy assets from the sponsor company, which are then
used by the SPE to secure its debt." 6 Finally, the sponsor company
is able to "convert receivables into cash while paying a lower rate
of interest than the alternative of debt or factoring, as the debt
allows the sponsors to remove receivables from their balance
sheets, and avoid recognizing debt incurred in the
Ripe for Abuse, but Few Went as Far as Enron's Fastow, FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2002,
available at www.fortune.com/fortune/investing/articles/0,15114,368276,00.htm (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
109 Id.
110 Id.
III Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 104.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 The three percent equity paid by the nominal owner can sometimes be a great
deal of money as most SPEs are meant to be very large-scale projects. FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVES INTERNATIONAL, Special Purpose Entities: Understanding the Guidelines
(Jan. 2002), available at http://www.fei.org/download/SPElssuesAlert.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation)
[hereinafter FEI].
115 Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 104.
116 Id.
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securitization.""17
However, there is a catch in the creation of an SPE. In order to
take advantage of the loophole allowing non-consolidation of
financial statements, the third party nominal owner must assume
all "substantial risks and rewards of its ownership in the SPE
assets."" 8 If the nominal owner is given any kind of assurance by
the SPE, such as a letter of credit, a guarantee, or insurance, then
the nominal owner may not be taking a risk, and the SPE would
not qualify for non-consolidation treatment. 19
As SPEs were increasingly used, the government gave no
guidance as to how accounting rules applied to them. 2 ' It is often
the case that accounting rules lag behind the creation of new
business vehicles. 2' This fact has led to the creation of a specific
body within the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB)-
the government agency responsible for setting many of the
federally mandated accounting rules.'22 This special body is
known as the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF).'23 Before the
Enron debacle, the rules governing accounting principles for SPEs
were found in Statement No. 125 promulgated by the FASB,'24
which deals mainly with securitization and servicing of
receivables, and ARB No. 51,125 which determines the specific
entities that must be consolidated into a single financial
statement. 1
26
In order to determine if a SPE's information should be
consolidated with that of the sponsor company in a single financial
117 Id.
118 FE, supra note 114.
119 Id.
120 Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 104.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. The EITF was started by the FASB in 1984 as a means to "provide timely
financial-reporting guidance on matters that the Board may not have addressed or issued
authoritative guidance." Id.
124 Statement No. 125 (FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. 1996) was later
replaced by Statement No. 140 (FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. 2000b). Id.
125 FASB Interpretation, supra note 103.
126 Hartgraves & Benston, supra note 104,
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statement, there is a two-part test.127 The first part of the test is to
identify the SPE's sponsor. 2 Many SPEs are created through the
involvement of multiple parties-both institutional and
individual-which may make determination of the sponsor's
identity difficult. 129 The EITF has come up with a set of factors
that can help determine the identity of the sponsor:
* Name and Purpose. What is the name and business
purpose of the SPE?
* Nature. What are the types of operations performed (for
example, lending or financing operations, asset
management, and insurance or reinsurance operations)?
* Referral Rights. Who has, and what is the nature of, the
relationships with third parties that transfer assets to or
from the SPE?
* Asset Acquisition. Who has the ability to control
whether or not asset acquisitions are from the open
market or from specific entities?
* Continuing Involvement. Who is providing the services
necessary for the entity to perform its operations and
who has the ability to change the service provider (e.g.,
asset management services, liquidity facilities, trust
services, financing arrangements)?
* Placement of Debt Obligations. Who is the primary
arranger of the debt placement and who performs
supporting roles associated with debt placement?
* Residual Economics. Who receives the residual
economics of the SPE including all fee arrangements?
" Fee Arrangements. Who receives fees for asset
management, debt placement, trustee services, referral
services, and liquidity/credit enhancement services?
How are the fee arrangements structured?
. Credit Facilities. Who holds the subordinated interests
in the SPE? 3 °
The second part of the test is to determine whether or not the
127 FEI, supra note 114.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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SPE should be consolidated with the sponsor.'31 The biggest factor
in determining whether an SPE should be consolidated is the
degree of control that the sponsor exerts over the SPE.1
32
The FASB and the EITF have also provided factors that should
be considered when examining whether consolidation is
appropriate:
" Is the capitalization of the SPE adequate at all levels,
particularly when (1) multi-tiered SPE structures are
utilized, (2) assets held by the SPE are volatile, and/or
(3) derivatives are used?
" Does the owner's interest represent a residual equity
interest in legal form?
* Is the equity holder truly subordinate to the debt
holders?
* How are profits and losses allocated? Does the equity
holder have both upside and downside potential?
* Is the equity investor an independent third party?
* Who has actual control over the management and
activities of the SPE?
* Are the risks and rewards of ownership retained by the
third-party equity investor for the entire term of the
SPE?
133
The FASB and the EITF give additional factors for
determining control. If any of the following factors are deemed to
be applicable, the SPE's information must be consolidated with
that of the sponsor:
* The majority owner of the SPE makes only a nominal
capital investment
* The activities of the SPE are virtually all on the
sponsor's or transferor's behalf
* The substantive risks and rewards of the assets or the
debt of the SPE rest directly or indirectly with the
sponsor. 134
However, one caveat remains. Even if one of the above
131 Id.
132 FE!, supra note 114.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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scenarios applies, the sponsor can still avoid consolidation with
the SPE as long as it meets certain "qualifying criteria" outlined in
FASB Statement 140.'3 That Statement "focuses on control."'
136
According to Statement 140, if the sponsor loses all control over
assets transferred to the SPE, then it may avoid consolidation. The
sponsor is deemed to have lost control if all of the following are
true:
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor -
put presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its
creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership.
b. Each transferee (or, if the transferee is a qualifying special-
purpose entity (SPE), each holder of its beneficial interests) has
the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial interests)
if received, and no condition both constrains the transferee (or
holder) from taking advantage of its right to pledge or exchange
and provides more than a trivial benefit to the transferor.
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the
transferred assets through either (1) an agreement that both
entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or redeem
them before their maturity or (2) the ability to unilaterally cause
the holder to return specific assets, other than through a cleanup
call.'37
While many of these considerations remain true, in the wake of
the Enron scandal, the FASB has proposed a new interpretation of
ARB No. 51 that applies to the consolidation of SPEs.13 8 If this
interpretation is promulgated as a new set of regulations,
corporations would have to consolidate their financial statements
with those of any SPEs over which they have a "fundamentally
similar relationship[],' ' 3  or in which they have a "controlling
financial interest in ... the assets, liabilities, and results of the
135 Id.
136 FASB, Summary of Statement No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing
of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities-A Replacement of FASB
Statement No. 125 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/
summary/stsuml40.shtml (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
137 Id.
138 FASB Interpretation, supra note 103.
139 Id.
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activities of the SPE.', 140
In order to reach these new goals, the new interpretation would
require consolidation in more situations. The interpretation creates
a new multi-part test for determining whether consolidation is
appropriate. If the interpretation is not applicable to a certain SPE,
then it will only have to be consolidated if the sponsor holds a
majority of the voting rights in the SPE - the traditional
requirement for consolidation.'41
The first part of the test is to determine whether the SPE in
question qualifies for consolidation treatment at all. The new
interpretation will not be applied to any SPE that meets one of the
following conditions: 1) the nominal owner has enough control
over the SPE to make decisions about the management of the SPE;
2) the SPE's equity investments provide it enough money to allow
it to operate without relying on support from other interest
holders; 14 2 3) the return on the investment of the equity interest
holders in the SPE is not guaranteed; 4) the assets exchanged for
equity are not subordinated interests in another SPE; and 5) the
equity investment did not come from the SPE or other parties with
an interest in the SPE.1
43
If none of these conditions exist, then the interpretation applies
to the SPE and the analysis must continue. The first thing that
must be determined is whether the sponsor company is the primary
beneficiary of the SPE. It is the primary beneficiary if it: 1)
provides "significant financial support 144 to the SPE; 2) no other
parties provide significant financial support; or 3) if other parties
do provide significant financial support, the support given by the
sponsor is much higher than that provided by any other parties.1
45
In determining whether the sponsor provides significant
financial support to the SPE, its interests in the SPE are combined
with the interests held in the SPE by the following:
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 This condition will be met if the third party nominal owner invests at least ten
percent (rather than the previously required three percent) of the equity investment in the
SPE. Id. at 5.
143 Id. at 4.
144 Id. at 5.
145 Id.
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a. Another SPE of which the enterprise is the primary
beneficiary,
b. A party that cannot fund or finance its operations without
support from the enterprise,
c. A party that has a de facto agency relationship with the
enterprise as a result of an agreement that it cannot sell, transfer,
or encumber its interests in the SPE without the prior approval
of the enterprise,
d. A party that received its interests as a contribution from the
enterprise, and
e. A party that has a de facto agency relationship with the
enterprise as a result of providing significant amounts of
professional services or similar business arrangements. 146
There are further rules regulating which enterprises have the
ability to be a primary beneficiary in an SPE 1 47 If the sponsor is
deemed to be the primary beneficiary of the SPE, then it must
consolidate its financial statements with that of the SPE. 148 These
regulations will be applied to any SPEs that are created after the
interpretation is adopted by FASB, and will be applied
retroactively to all SPEs created beforehand and that still exist as
of March 15, 2003.149
IV. Analysis
A. Did Dynegy Improperly Fail to Disclose the Existence and
Financial Information of Special Purpose Entities in
Project Alpha?
There were four business entities involved in Project Alpha
besides Dynegy: ABG Gas Supply, LLC; ABG Holding, LLC;
NGAI Funding, LLC; and DMT Supply, LP. 5° All but DMT
Supply, LP were SPEs.151 DMT Supply is a "wholly owned-
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 6-8.
148 Id. at 9.
149 Id.
150 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 2 (SEC Sept. 24, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8134.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
151 Id.
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subsidiary of Dynegy" and its information was reported on
Dynegy's financial statements.152 In the case of ABG Gas Supply,
the company is sponsored by Dynegy, but Dynegy has no
ownership interest in the SPE and is not affiliated with any of the
owners of ABG Gas Supply. 153 ABG Holding is sponsored by a
"member of the syndicate of lenders involved in Alpha" and
Dynegy has no ownership interest in it.'5 4 Finally, Dynegy also
sponsors NGAI Funding, but has no ownership interest in it.'55
This lack of ownership interest shows that Dynegy was abiding by
the letter of the law, at least in terms of the baseline ownership
interest test, and so, on the surface, properly omitted the entities'
financial information from its financial statements disclosed to
shareholders.
Nevertheless, the SEC found that Dynegy had materially
misled the public by failing to disclose the identity and
information of these SPEs. 156 To understand why this occurred, it
is necessary to look to the structure of the transactions involved in
Project Alpha. In the case against Dynegy at the SEC, Project
Alpha was characterized as "a flow-through matrix involving two
SPEs, three interconnected loans, a gas purchase agreement,
hedging transactions, and a transfer of basis and intended tax
benefit."' 57
Initially, NGAI Funding made a capital contribution of $307
million (out of $310 million it had borrowed from several lenders)
to DMT Supply in return for which NGAI funding received a
ninety-nine percent partnership interest in DMT Supply leaving
Dynegy with just one percent of the interest in DMT Supply.'58
NGAI Funding's interest in DMT was to expire after nine
months. 5 9 NGAI Funding's basis in DMT was then $307
million. 160
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 4.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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The second step of Project Alpha was a $300 million loan from
DMT to Dynegy.' 6' When NGAI Funding's interest in DMT
expired, its $307 million tax basis migrated to another subsidiary
of Dynegy, giving Dynegy seventy-nine million dollars in tax
savings. 112
In the third step of Project Alpha, ABG Supply entered into a
contract with DMT Supply. DMT Supply bought natural gas from
ABG Supply at below-market prices, which DMT then sold for a
profit on the market. 6 3 However, to buy the gas at the outset,
DMT had to incur losses, which it covered by taking out a loan.164
Most of the profits realized by DMT, totaling $300 million, were
distributed to NGAI Funding.'65 This arrangement allowed NGAI
Funding to pay off part of its loan.'66
When Dynegy released its 2001 financial statements, it
indicated that the $300 million it had received from DMT Supply
was cash flow rather than a loan. 6 7 In addition, it reported the
seventy-nine million dollars in tax savings from the migrating
basis as net income. 68 Dynegy even posted a letter to investors on
its website which said that Dynegy had not entered into "any
questionable transactions," even though it did disclose the
existence of Project Alpha.'69
While Dynegy held less than fifty percent ownership interest
test for consolidation of its financial statements with those of the
SPEs it sponsored (as it had no ownership interest whatsoever in
any of them) in Project Alpha, it is less clear that Dynegy was
truly able to avoid consolidation. As discussed above, GAAP
requires that there be an independent owner of the SPE who is
exposed to the "risks and rewards of ownership."' 171 In order to
show that this test has been met, the independent owner must have
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 5.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id. at 5.
170 Id. at 6; see also discussion of SPEs, supra notes 55-101 and accompanying text.
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invested at least three percent of the total amount of capital
invested in the SPE."'7 As the Commission pointed out in the
Dynegy case, more might be required in order to satisfy the test. 172
For example, there will not be substantial risk if the investor has
any kind of guarantees, insurance, or other assurances that there
will be a return on that investment.173
In this case, the Project Alpha transactions included "hedging
transactions"'7 4 which allowed ABG Supply's investors to avoid
having to take personal responsibility for losses incurred in the gas
contract with DMT.'75 For that reason, ABG could not be
considered a separate, independent entity, and its information
should have been consolidated with that of Dynegy. Had that been
done, Dynegy's investors would have been alerted to the true
nature of the transactions making up Project Alpha. 176 As such,
Dynegy's behavior in regard to Project Alpha's SPEs was in
violation of GAAP.
B. Did Dynegy Improperly Use Energy Wash Trades?
The matter of Dynegy's wash trades is more straightforward
than that of the SPEs. As discussed earlier, wash trades were
permissible, so long as they were done for a legitimate purpose.'77
However, their use had to be limited as they can cause alterations
to the energy marketplace.' 78 When they are used, it is necessary
that they not be included in reports of trade volume as part of the
ordinary course of business, as that will distort both the
marketplace and investor perceptions. 179
In the case of Dynegy, the company was aware that it should
not include the wash trades as part of its ordinary business.
However, the Commission made a great deal of the fact that
Dynegy failed to take precautions to ensure that the trades would
171 See supra notes 55-101 and accompanying text.
172 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134.
173 See supra 55-101 and accompanying text.
174 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134.
175 Id. at 6.
176 Id. at 7.
177 See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
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not be included in normal trading volumes.18° Because of this lack
of precautions, in one quarter, $1.7 billion of the $13 billion in
energy traded was "attributable to round trip trades.' ' 81 Of that
$1.7 billion, Dynegy reported $236 million as cash flow from
ordinary operations. 182 This action was certainly improper and in
violation of GAAP.
V. Conclusion
New, more stringent, and easier to understand guidelines for
determining whether financial information for SPEs should be
consolidated with that of their sponsor company could help
prevent misuse of SPEs in the future. FASB now recommends
looking to the purpose and source of control of the SPE, rather
than to the individual structure, to make it more likely that SPEs
under the direct control of the sponsor are consolidated with that
sponsor company.183 The control test, if applied in this case, would
have made it very unlikely that the true nature of the funds
resulting from Project Alpha could have been withheld from
investors. In addition, if pending legislation in the arena of wash
trades is passed, all wash trades would be banned-not just those
entered into for an improper purpose. With no wash trades
allowed whatsoever, it would be impossible for a company to
"forget" to exclude trade volumes resulting from wash trades.
The result of the case against Dynegy before the SEC was a $3
million civil penalty and a promise to cease engaging in the
problematic behavior.'84 This penalty may not seem like sufficient
punishment to stop behavior that allowed the company to realize
gains of over $300 million. However, there have been other
negative results to Dynegy that may punish the company more.
This enforcement action, combined with an ongoing lawsuit
against Dynegy in an ERISA fraud claim,'85 has led to much
180 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 7.
181 Id. at 8.
182 Id.
183 FASB Interpretation, supra note 103.
184 In re Dynegy, Inc., Admin. Proc. Rel. No. 33-8134, at 14.
185 Keller Rohrbach, LLP, ERISA Litigation Over 40 1(k), at
http://www.erisafraud.com/dynegy (website of the law firm representing plaintiffs in the
case) (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
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damage to Dynegy's credit rating. By July 23, 2002, Dynegy's
stock had dropped to $1.25 per share, a drop of sixty-three
percent.1 16 In addition, on February 18, 2003, a report was released
on CNN's money and investing website, published by
Morningstar, entitled "We Think Dynegy's Stock is Too Risky to
Own."'8 7 The negative publicity and reports had led to serious
changes at Dynegy.' s Dynegy no longer engages in energy trading
at all." 9 In its new, restructured form, Dynegy will only take part
in electricity and natural gas production, transmission, and
distribution. 19
While this enforcement action alone may not have been more
than a slap on the wrist for Dynegy, it, along with a combination
of negative publicity and credit ratings, was enough to cause
institutional changes. If other companies view such enforcement
actions as insufficient deterrents to future misconduct, then this
case may not do much to stop such behavior in the future.
However, this action, combined with pending legislation, and
more systematic awareness of misconduct, may protect the market
against future corporate wrongdoing by companies similar to
Dynegy.
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